This article begins by outlining the global historical context of contingent neoliberalism which has emerged in the late twentieth century as the dominant alternative economic trajectory to that of corporatist liberal welfare capitalism. Our analysis connects contemporary dimensions of labour migration and the challenges of economic development. It is relevant to the understanding of contemporary developments in Central and Eastern Europe in that we locate a case study of labour migration from the Baltic State of Latvia as an outcome of the application of the trajectory of neoliberalism which more widely now threatens to dismantle the Jacques Delors' 'Social Europe' model. We argue in the new post-communist EU member states such as Latvia, such socio-economic prescriptions based on a 'low road' of poor labour standards fail to deliver sustainable development for those who have adopted this path.
In Europe a century of experimentation and implementation of social democratic labour practices is being undone. In Eastern Europe, and in the Baltic States in particular, German social democratic attempts to influence the character of postcommunist societies have found singularly unreceptive audiences among the new ruling elites (Phillips 1999 Labour migration is now occurring in ways that are dramatically impacting social solidarity throughout the European Union. This threatens to undermine the 'Social Europe' model defined by Jacques Delors in the 1980s, but with a century of historical antecedents in the construction of coordinated market economies. In order to better conceptualise these important shifts, the authors attempt to situate the present trends in historical context providing a global, regional, and in the end, local case study of a new 'European' state suggesting just how fragile that model might now have become. We selected the new EU nation of Latvia to illuminate the changing political economy of labour migration in the enlarged EU and trajectories of economic development in Europe as a whole. The paradoxical and ultimately self-defeating character of the current trajectory, based on unrestrained free market ideology, specifically in terms of its impacts on 'the labour question' is the subject of the current article.
Recently, the 'Polish Plumber' has become the symbol over anxiety facing Europe as neoliberal policies and the expanded EU have created both a new economic logic and a political structure that work in tandem to promote labour migration. Yet the EU grew out of projects, such as the European Steel and Coal Community, to enhance economic stability and social cohesion of a historically divided Europe scarred by war. After World War II a period of historic peace, prosperity, and stability followed in the Transatlantic world with the Bretton Woods order of embedded liberalism which included an expanded social democracy (Ruggie 1982) . This post WW II order worked well, until the 1990s when Western Europe was plagued by economic crisis, which included the return of actual war in the Balkans. The economic turbulence undermining this order struck first in the US in the 1970s, followed by instability in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s, and thereafter contemporaneously visiting much the rest of the world.
Buffeted by the winds of this global economic storm, America constructed a program writ large for the world to solve these economic difficulties by restoring the calm of profits and order, in addition to riches for its business elite. It was a project that proposed reversing much of the previous economic assumptions underlying the existing Keynesian coordinated market economy order. The foundations of the Bretton Woods system, partly damaged by the above mentioned difficulties, were then razed. Replacing it would be a new edifice built on the footings of liberalised capital flows, making recourse to underutilized labour through more extensive labour utilization strategies (factor accumulation), and disciplining labour through cutting benefits and wages: all three are connected to the flow of labour migration from New Europe to points West.
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First, we briefly recapitulate the historically contingent emergence of liberalism (and neoliberalism) as a constrastive economic project to that of coordinated market economies which achieved contemporary historical underpinning in the now defunct Bretton Woods order. Secondly, we chart the demise of that order under the impact of US globalist ambitions. Third, we locate our case study country, Latvia, as a paradigmatic instance of the impact of neoliberal prescriptions in the new market economies of Eastern Europe in order to underpin our argument that an oppressive labour regime is stimulating a mass exodus of the workforce. Finally, we explore the 'inevitability' or otherwise of the adoption of a neoliberal strategy by briefly examining an alternative case study, Slovenia. Our conclusion attempts to argue that it is 'the labour question' which ultimately makes the trajectory of neoliberalism both entropic and self-defeating.
Europe, Liberalism and Corporatism
Many presume the nineteenth century marked a period of liberalism for Europe. Yet, really only twenty years of that century (1860-1880) were guided by truly free-trade prescriptions of such political economists as David Ricardo. At the century's start the Napoleonic Wars disrupted commerce among European nations. This period was then followed by continued British mercantilism and protectionism until its industrial advantage resulted in its changing course toward a program of more free trade. This would enable Britain to seize its comparative advantage in manufactured goods over less developed competitors. Karl Polanyi detailed this trajectory of development in his classic work The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1944 (Polanyi , 2001 .
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Yet, a period of relative free trade was also inaugurated by France in 1860. Napoleon III was convinced by Britain's example that free trade facilitated economic development. Most other European powers followed suit fearing they would be left behind. The result was Europe's slowest two decades of economic growth in the nineteenth century. What followed after 1880 transformed the world (Bairoch 1993).
Much of northern Europe rejected of Ricardian ideas and initiated a return to the German and American school of state interventionist economic theorists of Friedric List and Henry Carey (Hudson 1993) .
By the very early 1800s Europe's failed experiment in free trade was increasingly replaced by a regime of tariffs. But, rather than merely enable rentseeking national monopolies, as say Spanish mercantilism promoted, a number of key European powers began to launch industrial development drives. Among the most successful was Sweden. Labour poured out of Sweden onto America's shores from the mid to late nineteenth century. It is at this point that national development plans were launched in Sweden in key sectors, such as mining. Infant industries were supported with the desire of catching up with Britain, rather than merely exporting raw materials in a Ricardian comparative advantage model. Foreign capital then raced in and facilitated economic development. Yet, foreign capital was not the causal variable in Sweden's success, but rather state planning, which in turn enabled effective use of foreign funds. Indeed, such planning was in fact what attracted external investment capital. Once economically developed, Sweden stopped exporting labour and stabilized its economic trajectory on a path of national corporatist development (O'Rourke, Williamson 1999: 147-156) . Labour agitation in Scandinavia was another motivation in the move away from economic liberalism to coordinated model (corporatist) of development (Crowley 2007: 13) . The Swedish model demonstrated that labour and capital mobility can be useful for creating prosperity, but only when complemented by national development strategies ensuring this capital is productively employed in the real economy, rather than merely finding its way into speculative schemes. Spain and Italy also exported labour, but without state planning, it brought them little longer-term economic benefit.
Other strategies were also employed by Europe's northern developing states. 
The Bretton Woods Order
The Bretton Woods order, created in the wake of the global turbulence generated by the 20 th century's two World Wars and Great Depression, was hardly perfect, but it was successful. John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the British and American negotiators respectively, matched elements of corporatism and international trade to rebuild Europe's war-torn economies along coordinated economy principles.
Their new model was predicated on the need to first create the conditions for national development, as a necessary precondition for international trade, a model which was to deliver the highest levels of economic growth in world history. Moreover, it did so while often reducing inequalities within nations and between them. Like all systems, however, regardless of how successful, ultimately entropy dissolves. The very factors that made the Bretton Woods order work so well eventually turned into the engine of its destruction.
Five major crises emerged within the Bretton Woods order that were embedded in the logic of this system. They were the: 1) the crisis of global economic competition and overcapacity in the rich north, 2) increasing wage demands that formerly bought stability, but which later exacerbated a crisis of profits, 3) the democratic momentum within nations built up during the Bretton Woods order that 9 was no longer sustainable given governments' reduced ability to redistribute wealth, 4) the North/South conflict grounded in the crisis of rising expectations in the latter, and 5) the resource crisis (Brenner 2003) . In Thorstein Veblen's old phrasing, this system 'had the defects of its virtues' (Dowd 2000: 159) .
It was assumed in the immediate aftermath of World War II Japan would be relegated to the status of a producer of textiles and light industrial goods, and Germany was only to be reconstructed enough to make it a hedge against the Soviets.
That Japan and Germany should ever rise to economically challenge the US was 
US Comparative Advantages and Rolling back Coordinated Market Economies
The United States' response in the 1980s to changes in the global economy required the creation of greater labour agility and flexibility to roll back the pioneering protections labour achieved under the New Deal, and subsequently recapitulated in the wider Keynesian project. The effects of the neoliberal assault on labour standards for most employees have been longer hours, poorer safety, a decline or stagnation in per-hour compensation, and -in many instances -a form of unnatural rigidity, in which labour market insecurity ties employees to employers in order to retain their health benefits in a form of quasi-serfdom. This worker insecurity was celebrated by then US head of the Federal Reserve as restraining wages, and thus, inflationary pressures on profits (Federal Reserve Board Greenspan Testimony 1999 ).
Yet, for European social democracy, following the US example too closely would threaten one of the EU's major achievements -a measure of social equityand the legitimacy of the 'social dimension' meant to complement ever-closer economic integration. Moreover, these achievements could be sacrificed for relatively little, if any, gain predicated on the basis of a number of contestable assumptions.
First, there was the distorted argument that the gap between US and European productivity rates favours America. Accounting scandals with Enron, Arthur
Anderson and others have raised doubts about the reliability of much-proclaimed negative comparisons suggesting European productivity significantly lagging behind America. Comparisons are also affected by the incorporation of profits from US production outsourced overseas; due to the greater global presence of US companies, this is a factor that affects American figures more than Europe's. Moreover, some work practices common in the United States may boost corporate ratios and profits, but further distort comparisons: in the retail sector, for example, it is widespread practice for workers to work 'off-clock' (for no pay), thus inflating reported productivity rates (Henwood 2003: 66-67) .
Secondly, the US has the unique advantage of issuing the world's reserve currency, being its greatest power, and being too indebted for default to be possible.
As the US abandoned the Bretton Woods order in the 1980s, it exported its own incipient monetary crisis to Europe. As Richard Nixon's Treasury Secretary John Connally asserted, "We had a problem and we are sharing it with the rest of the world-just like we shared our prosperity. That's what friends are for" (Prestowitz 2003: 71) . Even more clearly, he asserted, "The dollar's our currency; but it's your problem" (Lander 2004) . Lastly, and most relevant to this article, at least part of the United States' continued economic growth rates has been built on mass immigration.
However, this adds labour, flexibility, and growth, but not necessarily efficiency. For the less advantaged nations is it siphons off talent raised and paid for by these nations, themselves in need of educated human capital. Secondly, migration is problematic for developed regions over the long term in that while it delivers more labour (factor accumulation), it dilutes incentives to increase efficiency on the part of capital by keeping labour cheap. Paradoxically, within Europe a mass migration is now underway from poorer to richer nations that mirrors this 'American' path toward development.
The telescopic view provided above for the general structural forces that led to the unravelling of the Bretton Woods order, is complemented in the next section by an examination of the influence of neoliberal policies on the transition zone of 'New Europe'. We use the ex-Soviet Republic of Latvia to inspect the changes wrought by neoliberalism on labour and the push factors propelling that country's labour exodus West. Together, these two multi-level analyses, both the preceding global and macro above, and the following regional and micro below, show why this labour migration contributes to maintaining economic growth in a neoliberal Europe, while demonstrating both its great human cost and its paradoxical lack of sustainability.
The Case of Latvia: Neoliberalism and Labour migration
In Latvia (New Europe) we see represented the greatest antithesis to economic corporatism, or coordinated market economies built over the past century in northern Where collective agreements exist, they are rather weak when it comes to issues such as securing additional severance pay in the event of dismissals. More likely, union members will not be re-employed. 'Liberal wage setting laws' also ensure that legal minimum wages are low by international standards (OECD 2003: 59) . In a candid appraisal of 'labour flexibility' in the Baltic States OECD observes:
"While such flexibility is advantageous for business, there can be a danger of abuse by less-scrupulous employers if the institutional framework is too weak. Some groups of low-skilled workers, notably in small private firms, are probably in a vulnerable position if their employers are tempted to reduce wage costs more than is legally allowed" (2003: 
The 'Exit Strategy'
From the standpoint of Latvian society, deteriorated labour standards may benefit individual employers in the short-term, but reliance on this strategy is not 'costless'. Accession to the European Union has at least partially opened doors which were once closed. Against previous predictions, the most recent period has seen a significant outflow of labour seeking higher wages and better working conditions in old Member
States (Krieger 2004) . Latvian analysts estimate that perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 featuring highest on the list of expressed priorities (Krieger and Fernandez 2006: 8, 15 ). Overall, 7.4 per cent of Latvians interviewed indicated some degree of preparedness to move to another EU country (Krieger and Fernandez 2006: 11-12 ).
Yet, the adoption of an 'exit strategy' by tens of thousands of workers from the new Member States such as Latvia is both an understandable and an inevitable consequence of the desire to find a better working life, and to escape the adverse nature of the domestic working environment. In a rare instance of public candour, the Latvian State Employment Agency has conceded the importance of low levels of pay and the "not uncommon practice for companies to employ workers illegally, or officially pay them the minimum salary thus decreasing their level of social protection" in prompting workforce exit. A representative of the agency observes:
"employers in Latvia are not ready to motivate their employees and give them good working conditions. This is the main reason why our citizens are looking for jobs in other European countries" (Akule 2006 ).
Within the current Latvian government there seems to be reluctance to acknowledge the scale of the issue or develop new public policy options. One of the few critical commentators on the current situation, Raita Karinte of the Latvian Academy of Sciences suggests that the problem of emigration in Latvia is far more serious than the Latvian government cares to admit. While the government insists that emigration facilitates the improvement of labour force quality, as emigrants can learn a language, master skills, earn money and return home more economically better-off, "The fact that many emigrants engage in unskilled jobs that frequently do not correspond to their level of education, and that they do not wish to return home, has never been addressed by the government" (EIROnline 26 January 2006).
Legacies and Prospects
While the costs to labour have been high, the current impressive economic growth of the 'Baltic Tigers' reveals the success of their neoliberal economic development strategy and at the same time the seeds of its demise. On one level, global advances in transportation and manufacturing have lowered costs of setting up production abroad. When matched by a reordering of the international political economy toward mobility of capital that occurred in the wake of the crisis of profitability in the 1970s, this has provided capital with new mobility options. Moreover, given that post-Soviet industry has been largely controlled by West European nations and oriented toward re-export to Western markets, there is no incentive to create corporatist systems in post-communist economies in which high wages create demand for local industry that in turn might deliver both political stability and profits, as for example occurred in West Europe after World War II (Bohle and Greskovits 2004 ). On the other hand, Latvia has succeeded in attracting FDI, as predicted by neoliberal theory, but it has gone into unproductive speculative sectors, such as real estate, along with some rather primitive production connected to the timber sector.
This has been facilitated by the low tax environment, fuelling real estate speculation. little production, high rates of speculative activity, and an extreme emigration levels driven by poverty that threaten the very demographic survival of these states.
Conclusion
Global economic history, and the rejection of its lessons, is the backdrop to current events in which world-systemic pressures are working to remake the European political economy away from coordinated markets. In the interstices of these structural forces shaping the global economy, however, there is room for exercising agency. This agency has been demonstrated on the national level with states such as Slovenia with state policies promoting industry and better worker protection. The political prospects exist for extending these measures throughout the New Europe when economic crisis provides another opening for continental wide policy change.
It is only in the context of an understanding of the unfolding political economy of an increasingly neoliberal European project that the Latvian responses make sense, while revealing the problems neoliberalism is generating throughout Europe. The donothing-pursue-the-'low road' strategy is simply the reflection of a conventional neoliberalist doctrine that argues the market will 'solve' all problems. Yet the conventional wisdom of business and political elites disguises deeper currents of opposition which although just beginning to emerge in parts of the old Europe, are also finding a first sympathetic echo in the New Europe. The haemorrhaging of society's human resources through mass out-migration poses profound dilemmas for the future social development of post-communist societies such as Latvia and consideration of 'the labour question' cannot be postponed indefinitely. The struggle will be to convince the peoples of the newly reconfigured Europe that an opportunity exists to pursue a very different trajectory of development to that which is currently being imposed upon them. What is at issue on this contested terrain of choice is two rather different economic and social models which now vie for political resonance in determining not just Latvia's, but ultimately Europe's future.
